仲裁早新闻：法院只在仲裁庭的决定超出合理范围...新加坡案例

仲裁早新闻：法院只在仲裁庭的决定超出合理范围时才对其进行干涉（新加坡案例）

2020年2月28日，在China Machine New Energy Corp v Jaguar Energy Guatemala LLC & Anor[2020] SGCA 12一案中，新加坡上诉法院重申法院只在仲裁庭的决定超出合理范围时才进行干涉，而本案中仲裁庭作出仅律师可见令的行为并未违反程序正义，且并未对上诉人的权利造成严重影响。不仅如此，上诉人未勤勉主张其权利，甚至同意修订仲裁时间表并坚持主证据听证会如期举行，因而上诉法院维持初审法院裁定，拒绝撤销裁决。

一、背景介绍

本案主要涉及仲裁庭在仲裁程序中做出仅律师可见令的合法性问题。“仅律师可见令”是指在商事诉讼或仲裁中，若证据涉及机密信息，但却又需要一定程度的披露的，则法院或仲裁庭可以通过下达该令而使得该文件仅得由律师或专家证人查阅，当事人自身不得查阅的制度。

本案上诉人中国机械新能源股份有限公司是承包商，与被上诉人危地马拉公司订立合同，进行该公司名下的发电厂的建设。《工程、采购与建设合同》中约定，若发生争议则当事人可据国际商会（ICC）1998年《仲裁规则》规定将争议提交新加坡仲裁，仲裁条款规定了快速仲裁，其作出裁决的期限为选定第三名仲裁员开始的90日；若仲裁庭多数同意，则可以再延期90日（Notably, cl 20.2 provided for an expedited arbitration: it required that the award be issued within 90 days of the selection of the third arbitrator; or, if the majority of the arbitrators agreed, within a further 90 days.）。

之后本案涉案工程发生延误，被上诉人于2014年1月终止合同并提起仲裁。本案仲裁庭于2014年3月组庭，依照仲裁协议案件应在2014年6月之前作出裁决，若延长该期限则应在2014年9月之前作出裁决。双方于2014年5月同意修改仲裁时间表，之后仲裁庭作出了数个程序令，其中有涉及证据披露的问题。

被上诉人担心上诉人会滥用文件中的信息，尤其是中止协议之后的承包商的信息来干扰该项目的进行，包括威逼利诱其他承包商，使其他承包商不为被上诉人完成项目。因此，被上诉人表示仅愿意以“仅律师可见”为基础向上诉人的律师和专家证人披露13项证据，并主张这些证据不得披露给上诉人的员工。之后，仲裁庭支持被上诉人主张，作出包括“仅律师可见令”（Attorneys’- Eyes Only Order）。

各方当事人于2014年12月18日在第三号程序令中对某些时间表达成了合意。在后续的仲裁程序中，仲裁庭屡次修改了仅律师可见令，并最终撤销了该令。

在仲裁期间，上诉人还对其代理律师和专家证人团队人选进行大量撤换，逾期提交专家证人意见，而且程序中还有一些涉及证据披露的问题。

主证据听证会于2015年7月进行，与此同时，涉案项目的施工于该月完工。仲裁庭于2015年11月作出裁决，被上诉人胜诉。

上诉人不服，于2016年2月申请撤销仲裁庭的裁决，其中主要主张之一是仅律师可见令对其不公平，仲裁庭并未给其充分机会以回应被上诉人的主张。初审法院驳回其撤裁申请，上诉人不服，向上诉法院提起上诉。

二、法院认定

上诉法院驳回上诉。

1、法院仅在仲裁庭的决定超出合理范围时才进行干涉

法院认为仲裁庭确实认定存在强迫性理由以让其下达仅律师可见令，而法院并没有理由推翻该决定（First, the Tribunal did make a determination that there were compelling grounds to impose the AEO Regime, and there was no reason to disturb that determination (GD at [139]–[147]).）。

依照Triulzi Cesare SRL v Xinyi Group (Glass) Co Ltd[2015] 1 SLR 114案，法院的正确做法是结合事实情况审核仲裁庭的作为或者不作为是否超越了合理范围，对于此（1）仅应参考仲裁庭在关键时刻所知的情况来评估仲裁庭的行为和决定，不能参考仲裁庭所不知道的情形（the tribunal’s conduct and decisions should only be assessed by reference to what was known to the tribunal at the material time），而在Triulzi Cesare案中，法院即认为认为Triulzi不能批评仲裁庭未考虑Triulzi其本身未提交仲裁庭考虑的事项（the High Court held that Triulzi could not criticise the tribunal for failing to consider something that Triulzi itself had not put before the tribunal for its consideration）；（2）依照Call Internet Services Ltd v Telus Communications Co [2013] BCAA 366案，法院在行使程序裁量权时，应基于以下事实给予仲裁庭一部分尊重：（i）仲裁庭在仲裁程序方面有着广泛的裁量权，并且（ii）仲裁庭在复杂事实背景下行使裁量权，法院可能并不了解其中的一些细致的要点。因此法院不应对仲裁庭的程序决定进行微观管理，而应该对仲裁庭的程序决定给予“实质性的尊重”（the court should accord a margin of deference to the tribunal in its exercise of procedural discretion. Deference is accorded in recognition of the fact that (i) the tribunal possesses a wide discretion to determine the arbitral procedure, and (ii) that discretion is exercised within a highly specific and fact-intensive contextual milieu, the finer points of which the court may not be privy to. It has therefore been said that the court ought not to micromanage the tribunal’s procedural decision-making, and will instead give “substantial deference” to procedural decisions of the tribunal）。

这意味着，依照ABB AG v Hochtief Airport GmbH [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep1案，法院不会仅因为其做法可能与仲裁庭不同即干预仲裁，而法院需要满足很高的要求才得干预仲裁，法院必须有实际依据来主张仲裁庭“非理性或反复无常”地进行了仲裁程序，或者仲裁庭的诉讼程序“与合理预期的仲裁程序相差甚远，必须予以纠正”（This means that the court will not intervene simply because it might have done things differently (Soh Beng Tee at [58], citing ABB AG v Hochtief Airport GmbH [2006]2 Lloyd’s Rep 1 at [67]). Overall, the threshold for intervention is a relatively high one: there must be a real basis for alleging that the tribunal has conducted the arbitral process “either irrationally or capriciously” (SohBeng Tee at [65(d)]), or where the tribunal’s conduct of the proceedings is “so far removed from what could reasonably be expected of the arbitral process that it must be rectified” (ASM Shipping at [38]).）。对此，上诉法院认为没有理由撤销仲裁庭的裁决。

2、本案不存在举证责任倒置的情况

上诉人主张仅律师可见令将举证责任倒置，导致上诉人应承担举证责任，因而违规，裁决应被撤销。上诉法院指出举证责任从未倒置，而还是由被上诉人负责证明对于某个或某类文件应被授予仅律师可见令（the burden of proof was never moved to CMNC – it remained on Jaguar to establish that for each document or class of documents, an AEO order was warranted）。

此外，法院重申本案要点并不在于仅律师可见令是否对上诉人的案件准备工作造成不利影响，而是仲裁庭作出仅律师可见令的结果是否超出合理范围地不公平或不合理。

3、仲裁庭的做法并未违反程序正义

上诉法院认为，仲裁庭在作出仅律师可见令时确实审慎地考虑了其对上诉人可能造成的潜在不利影响（the Tribunal did carefully weigh the potential prejudice to CMNC in making the AEO Order），并且驳回上诉人主张的仲裁庭的做法违反自然正义的主张。

上诉法院认为，仲裁庭只是根据实际情况尽力而为，以在当事人之间的利益取得平衡，主要表现在：首先，上诉人保留了在仅律师可见令第二阶段下申请查阅文件的选项，但却从未使这种途径具有可行性，因而认为该等申请过程会“繁重且不具有可操作性”是不对的，而法院认为这种操作相对而言比较直截了当；第二，《修订裁定》消除了由于适用仅律师可见令而导致的任何不利；第三，依上诉人申请仲裁庭重新设置了仲裁程序时间表，这表明在上诉人在知晓仅律师可见令、《修订裁定》的前提下对新时间表作出了同意；第四，在对时间表达成合意后，上诉人的律师做出了多项保证，其中包括上诉人及其专家证人都已知晓精简过后的时间表，并且上诉人及其专家证人能做到这些时间表的要求（First, CMNC retained the option of applying for access under the second stage of the AEO Regime, but never availed itself of this avenue of access. There was no basis for thinking that the application process would be “onerous and impractical”; the Judge thought the process would likely have entailed “a relatively straightforward exercise” (GD at[156]–[157]). Second, the Redaction Ruling (which was made less than a month after the imposition of the AEO Regime) would have cured any prejudice caused by the application of the AEO Regime (GD at [158]). Third, the Tribunal reset the procedural timetable for the Arbitration pursuant to CMNC’s request by issuing PO 3, which reflected timelines that CMNC itself had agreed to in the context of the AEO Regime and the Redaction Ruling (GD at [159]). Fourth, after the timelines were agreed, CMNC’s counsel gave multiple assurances that they (and CMNC’s experts) were aware of the compressed timelines and that they would be able to meet them (GD at [160]).）。

4、仅律师可见令并未造成严重影响

上诉人还主张其专家证人的准备工作受到了仅律师可见令的严重影响，但上诉法院驳回其主张，理由是上诉人主张的违规的行为并不对其造成不利影响，而严格形式的仅律师可见令仅存在了一个月，在那之后，上诉人的员工即可访问那些文档，其中的敏感信息已经被涂黑，而即便后来仲裁庭针对较小额度的索赔文档恢复了仅律师可见令，但上诉人一开始就对此进行了同意（In any case, we do not see how CMNC could have been prejudiced by any alleged breach. The AEO Regime, in its most restrictive form (meaning when these documents were presumptively not subject to disclosure to CMNC’s employees at all), lasted less than a month. Thereafter, CMNC’s employees received access to redacted documents, and although the AEO Regime was later reinstated for the smaller claim documents, this was an arrangement that CMNC, as we have noted, had initially agreed to.）。

上诉法院还注意到，仅律师可见令在主证据听证会前四个月即被取消（In any case, all restrictions were lifted by 18 March 2015 – almost four months before the main evidentiary hearing in July 2015.）。

此外，各方当事人于2014年12月18日在第三号程序令中对某些时间表达成了合意，即该等时间表是在仅律师可见令的背景下达成的，因此上诉人被视为已经考虑过仅律师可见令对其可能造成的不利影响之后才对这些时间表达成合意的（It must also be noted that the parties had agreed to certain timelines in PO 3 on 18 December 2014 (see [36] above). In other words, these timelines were agreed in the context of the AEO Regime, and therefore must be taken as having accounted for whatever adverse impact the AEO Regime would have had on CMNC’s ability to meet those timelines.）

5、上诉人未勤勉主张其权利

上诉法院指出，原则上，若一方当事人主张在仲裁过程中有严重违规，则该方当事人必须让仲裁庭适当意识到若其继续采取其行动则该方当事人会对此提出异议（if a party intends to contend that there has been a fatal failure in the process of the arbitration, then there must be fair intimation to the tribunal that the complaining party intends to take that point at the appropriate time if the tribunal insists on proceeding）。

主张存在违规的当事人至少应努力中止仲裁程序，直到对该违规受到适当救济为止。主张存在违规的当事人不能单纯保留其立场而直到裁决作出后视结果再决定是否提出异议（This would ordinarily require that the complaining party, at the very least, seek to suspend the proceedings until the breach has been satisfactorily remedied (if indeed the breach is capable of remedy) so that the tribunal and the non-complaining party has the opportunity to consider the position. This must be so because if indeed there has been such a fatal failure against a party, then it cannot simply “reserve” its position until after the award and if the result turns out to be palatable to it, not pursue the point, or if it were otherwise to then take the point.）。

上诉法院指出，上诉人一方面主张仲裁程序违反自然正义，但在另一方面则表现出自己可以且有能力和意愿来继续仲裁，这构成了自相矛盾（In the final analysis, it is a contradiction interms for a party to claim, as CMNC now does, that the proceedings had been irretrievably tainted by a breach of natural justice, when at the material time it presented itself as a party ready, able and willing to carry on to the award.）。在本案的这种情况下，当事人若选择这种做法则应责任自负，法院不允许当事人采取机会主义策略对冲其可能面临的风险（If a party chooses to carry on in such circumstances, it does so at its own peril. The courts must not allow parties to hedge against an adverse result in the arbitration in this way. ）。

如果上诉人确实认为因为仅律师可见令的程序违规问题而不应在2015年7月举行听证会，则其有责任向仲裁庭明确说明这一点，使仲裁庭意识到这样做会剥夺其公平听证权而导致严重错误程序。但是，上诉人不仅没有要求中止仲裁程序，甚至坚持要求在2015年7月举行主证据听证会（If indeed CMNC believed that proceeding with the hearing in July 2015 in the circumstances it was presented with was impossible, then it was incumbent on CMNC to make that abundantly clear to the Tribunal. Specifically, CMNC had to bring home its concern that proceeding with the main evidentiary hearing at that time would be futile because it would be on terms that denied it a fair and reasonable opportunity of preparing its case and this resulted in a fatally flawed process. However, and as mentioned at [165]– [166] above, not only was this not done, CMNC never requested a vacation of the July 2015 hearing dates. On the contrary, CMNC persisted in maintaining that it wished to press on with the main evidentiary hearing in July 2015.）。这导致上诉人的仲裁庭失控的主张存在自相矛盾之处（this puts the lie to CMNC’s submission that the Tribunal had “lost control”）。

上诉法院认为其并无干涉仲裁庭裁决的理由，因而驳回上诉。

三、评论

一般而言，仲裁庭在作出诸如仅律师可见令这样的程序措施的时候需要权衡三方面的权益，其一是案件审理的需要，其二是持有该机密信息的当事人的保密需要，其三则是对方当事人的平等权和程序正义。由本案可以看出，新加坡法院的立场是整体上尊重仲裁庭进行案件审理的需要，只要仲裁庭的做法在合理范围内即予以尊重，重申法院不应对仲裁庭的程序决定进行微观管理，而法院必须有实际依据来主张仲裁庭严重违规或偏离合理预期的情况下才进行介入。

本案中法院拒绝介入的主要原因包括：仲裁庭实际上考虑了本案的情况以及对上诉人可能造成的潜在不利影响才作出仅律师可见令；此外，仅律师可见令的影响较小，在主证据听证会前四个月即被取消，而且严格形式的仅律师可见令仅存在了一个月，之后上诉人的员工即可访问删去敏感信息的文档；不仅如此，当事人自身并未努力申请中止仲裁程序，反而同意修改仲裁时间表，坚持主证据听证会按时进行，因而在一定程度上视为对仅律师可见令的同意。

从本案中可以看出，若当事人对仲裁庭的做法有疑虑，则应及时提出并申请中止仲裁程序，不能默许，甚至支持仲裁程序继续进行，而事后再以仲裁庭违反正当程序申请撤裁，否则可能会被法院认为其认可仲裁庭的做法。

信息源于：临时仲裁ADA