时间是否是核心要素

航运佬

詹先凯

【摘要】在航运实务中，经常碰到各种关于时间规定的条款，比如ETA通知，交还船通知，时效条款的规定等等。那么这些时间对于特定的合约而言是否是核心要素呢？如果一方违反了是否赋予另一方索赔，甚至撤销合约的权利？本文从实务中见到条款出发，来谈谈这一问题。

【关键词】时间、要素、条件条款、essence

在航运实务中，关于时间方面的规定常见于期租合约下的交还船通知，租金支付等；承租合约和买卖合约下各种ETA通知条款，以及时效条款等。那么这些时间条款对于特定的合约而言是否是核心要素呢？一方违反是否赋予另一方索赔甚至可撤销合约的权利？没有确切的答案，得看特定的合约对于时间条款是如何规定的。

在普通法下，时间是合约的核心要素，如果当事方没有在指定的时间内履行即为毁约。最常见的是交船时间条款或者受载期条款，如果没在指定的时间内交船或者抵达装货港并准备就绪，那么出租人即为毁约，承租人解除合约的权利。如果普通的时效条款或者租金支付条款，要求另一方在多少时间内给予答复或提交文件或安排付款，如果合约没有相反明确的规定，那么一方违反并不赋予另一方拒绝履行合约的权利。

简单归纳起来就是，如果合约中已经明确规定时间是核心要素（essence）；或者一方不合理行事导致延误，另一方给予了通知，要求该方在合理的时间内履约；或者因合约环境的变化，时间变成了要素，那么无论延误或违反的结果如何轻微，都构成毁约。无辜的一方即刻有权终止租约并索赔损失。

参之前多篇合约解释的相关文章，合约解释必须将前后文作为一个整体来解释。本文先从实务中碰到的一个关于时间规定的条款说起，再结合判例来说说如何判断时间是否是核心要素的问题。

该条款在之前涉及NOR和LAYTIME计算争议的文章中有提到，具体描述如下：

6.Final Accounting for Demurrage and Despatch

Owner shall provide Charterer with its calculations of demurrage or despatch, time sheets, Statement of Facts and signed Notices of Readiness within [15] days after departure from the final loadport or disport. Charterer shall settle the undisputed balance of demurrage or despatch, if any, within [30] days of the date of final discharge only if Owner has fulfilled this requirement and the other two preconditions set out in lines 39 to 44 of this Contract. Charterer shall inform Owner of any elements of Owner’s calculations of demurrage or despatch which are disputed by Charterer. Owner shall respond in writing to any communications from Charterer disputing Owner’s calculations of demurrage or dispatch within [10] Singapore working days of receipt by Owner, failing which Owner shall be deemed to have accepted and agreed with Charterer’s objections to Owner’s calculations. If Owner and Charterer are not agreed on calculation of demurrage or dispatch, the dispute shall be resolved by negotiation and agreement or arbitration in accordance with clause 59.

该条款首先要求出租人在离开装卸港15天内提供滞期速遣费计算的明细及事实记录和签字的准备就绪通知书。关于签字的NOR，在之前文章关于The “Ocean Neptune”案中说过，因为出租人未能提供装卸港有签字的NOR，导致出租人被判索赔滞期费不成立。因此这是该条款的第一个“陷阱”，出租人必须提供签字的NOR。其次，承租人在最终卸完货后30天内有义务结算滞期速遣的前提条件是，出租人已经履行了合约第39行到44行的要求及两个前提条件。如果出租人未履行，则承租人无义务结算滞期速遣，此为第二个“陷阱”。

这里所说的15天和30天的规定，因为没有明确说明违反的后果，因此该时间不是合约的要素。即，如果出租人未能在15天内提供相关文件，承租人还是得继续履行合约下的结算滞期速遣的义务；出租人在最终卸货30天后仍未履行合约第39行到44行的要求及两个前提条件，也不免除承租人结算滞期速遣的责任。

但是随后要求出租人对于承租人任何有关滞期费计算需在10个新加坡工作日给予答复，否则即视为出租人接受和同意承租人的异议。这里的10个工作日的时间要求，是否可视为合约中已经明确规定时间是核心要素（essence）；或者一方不合理行事导致延误，另一方给予了通知，要求该方在合理的时间内履约？笔者认为如果出租人未在10天内做出答复的话，该时间（10天内）变成了要素，那么无论延误或违反的结果如何轻微，都构成出租人毁约。无辜的一方-承租人即刻有权终止租约，免除承担滞期费的责任。

另一方面关于合约解释，作为合约解释的基本原则之一，应将合约当作一个整体来看待，该条款中已经明确说明，如果出租人对于承租人任何有关滞期费计算未在10个新加坡工作日给予答复，保持沉默直接的严重后果是被视为接受和同意承租人的异议。从这个方面来解释，也与10天是核心要素达成了一致结论。

笔者介绍这个条款，想说明的是BHPB作为世界一流的公司，自有其过人之处。在一个看似简单的条款里，设置了好几个“陷阱”，想不想当猎人，去收拾跳进陷阱里的猎物，完全是看他们心情。笔者一直想将这些陷阱比喻为炸弹，一份合约，和一座房子一样，人家在合约中设置了无数陷阱，和开发商在房屋建造的过程中，在家门口，客厅，厨房，洗手间，房间，窗台等等埋了无数炸弹道理是一样的。人家想不想引援合约条款和开发商想不想引爆炸弹是一个道理。如果想全身而退，那么必须要求去掉这些陷阱或要求开发商拿掉这些炸弹，否则都不安全；想想床底下还埋着炸弹，肯定睡不着。

笔者在努力成为这样一个“拆弹砖家”，但首先得有一座房子，即一份合约在手。广告时间，现承接各类船型的租船合约的拟定，把关，修复工程，量大优惠，即刻申请便可享高达88折优惠。娱乐广告之后，现在回到本文重点，接下来，来看看本文将介绍的Union Eagle Limited v. Golden Achievement Limited (Hong Kong) [1997] UKPC 5案。

一、基本案情

上诉人Union Eagle Limited (以下简称“买方”)在1991年8月1日与

被诉人Golden Achievement Limited(以下简称“卖方”)签订了一份书面楼宇买卖协议，买方以港币420万元购买卖方的一位于港岛区的单位。根据买卖合约，买方向卖方的律师，作为利益相关者（律师行Robert C.K. Tsui＆Co.）支付了420,000港元的按金。交接工作将于1991年9月30日或在那天下午5点之前完成。时间在协议中的各个方面都是合约要素，其中第12条规定：如果买方未能遵守本协议的任何条款和条件，则支付的款项和任何部分支付的购买价款应被完全没收，并作为付给卖方的约定违约金（而不是罚款），卖方有权（没有义务向买方提交转让）解除本协议，并保留本协议或其任何部分或其部分的主体或转售此财产。

If the Purchaser shall fail to comply with any of the terms and conditions of this Agreement the deposit money and any part payment of purchase price so paid shall be absolutely forfeited as and for liquidated damages (and not a penalty) to the Vendor who may (without being obliged to tender an Assignment to the Purchaser) rescind this agreement and either retain the Property the subject of this Agreement or any part or parts thereof or resell the same.

但是买方错过了9月30日上午约定检查楼宇单位的时间，在中午前不久，卖方律师楼的一名买卖业务员周小姐打电话给买方的律师楼一名职员田小姐，并警告说购买价格的余额应该在下午5点之前支付。否则她的客户将行使其撤销和没收按金的权利。在通常的香港惯例下，卖方须填写律师的承诺书以转交所有权证明文件。田小姐回复确认她的客户将按照合约及时完成。但是到了下午5时，这还没有发生。在下午5点1分，周小姐再次打电话给田小姐，她说钱没有到达的话，卖方保留撤销和没收按金的权利。田小姐回答说，快件正在路上。

快件在5点10分抵达，信函中含有购买款项的支票和以前达成一致的承诺函。徐先生打电话给他的客户听候指示，但被告知协议已经被撤销。在下午5点11分，周小姐打电话给买方的律师楼，告诉他们买卖合约被撤销，并将信函和里面的东西退还给送件人。

最终，买方未能在1991年9月30日下午5时前完成尾款交付。卖方宣布买卖合约被撤销，买方的按金被没收。

二、争议焦点

买方的御用大律师Lyndon-Stanford先生认为，信函连同支票在下午5点10分已经送达卖方的律师楼，尽管未能在5点前及时履行是违规行为，但卖方并未接受毁约及撤销合约，因此买卖合约仍然存在。在下午5点10分买方仍有权交付履行完成合约，并且已经提出此要求；卖方未能接受买方的给付是买方的违规违约。卖方认为买方违反了买卖合约在下午5点前支付买卖余额的要求，而该时间是合约的要素，从而赋予卖方撤销合约，并没收按金的权利。

买方认为他的轻微违约，迟了10分钟并不会导致合约丧失，要求法院下达强制履行令，执行楼宇买卖。

三、法官判决

本案唯一不寻常的特点是，在合约本应完成的时间过去十分钟后，买方要求支付购买价格，买方拒绝接受如此轻微的失误会导致合约的丧失，并寻求强制履行程序。Cheun法官驳回了买方的诉讼，枢密院多数法官维持了他的判决（Litton V.-P.和Ching J.A.，Godfrey J.A.持异议）。

买方不服判决，上诉，最终上诉到由Goff of Chieveley, Griffiths, Mustill, Hoffmann, Hope of Craighead五位大法官组成的枢密院司法委员会。

主审Hoffmann勋爵认为，本案中的主要问题是，法院是否已经并且应该行使了衡平法赋予的权力来免除买方迟于履行合约的后果，并下达强制履行令。

The chief question in the case is whether the court has, and should have exercised, an equitable power to absolve the purchaser from the contractual consequences of having been late and to decree specific performance.

买方的御用大律师Lyndon-Stanford提出了其它三个论点，其中一个在上诉法院未获得成功，另外两个是新的。Hoffmann勋爵认为，法院可以很快处理这些问题，但为了解释前两个问题，有必要提供一些进一步的细节，说明在完成最后一天发生的事情。事情如前文所述，在5点前买方未能按照合约要求完成支付余款，卖方时候撤销合约并没收按金。

买方代理律师的观点吸引了持有异议的Godfrey J.A.法官，但本委员会认为这是站不住脚的。诚然，在接受违规违约之前，合约仍然存在，违约方可能会交付履行。因此，行为等同于预期违约的一方可以在其被接受之前根据其条款悔改并履行合约，但他无权单方面按照其他条款进行交付履行。一旦下午5点已经过去了，买方履行合约已不再可能。只有以某种形式的放弃或禁止反言为理由，卖方才能被要求接受迟到的履约。

This argument attracted Godfrey J.A. but their Lordships think it is quite untenable. It is true that until there has been acceptance of a repudiatory breach, the contract remains in existence and the party in breach may tender performance. Thus a party whose conduct has amounted to an anticipatory breach may, before it has been accepted as such, repent and perform the contract according to its terms. But he is not entitled unilaterally to tender performance according to some other terms. Once 5.00 p.m. had passed, performance of the contract by the purchaser was no longer possible. The vendor could be required to accept late performance only on the grounds of some form of waiver or estoppel.

Hoffmann勋爵认为，买方代表律师的第二个论点没有什么法律依据。御用大律师Lyndon-Stanford先生邀请法官们从证据中推断出送件者已将信函递交给周小姐，并且她已将信函打开并检查其内容，然后再退回。他因此认为，这是对合约的肯定。Cheung法官发现周小姐事实上并没有对信函做了什么，即使她打开了信函，法官们也不认为这可能被解释为接受迟到的履约。周小姐说的一切都明确表示要约被拒绝了。

御用大律师Lyndon-Stanford先生的第三个论点是买方无论如何都有权归还他的按金，因为它不是真正的预先估计的损失。他接受了这样一个观点：在正常情况下的合理按金，并没有询问是否是对损害赔偿的预估。Howe v.Smith (1884) 27 Ch.D. 89案，Workers Trust& Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] A.C. 573案。但他表示，该保证金并未根据该规定加盖印章，因为第12条将其描述为“如和作为约定违约金（而不是罚款）”。法院不认为这些关于按金措辞剥夺了其按金的性质，履约的保证金，在撤销时可以没收。

Hoffmann勋爵认为这清除了上诉中主要的方法问题。为减轻合约处罚和丧失权利的衡平管辖权的界限在某些地方是不准确的。但是本委员会并不认为在这种情况下需要更确切地描绘他们，因为他们同意Litton V.-P.法官，事实远远超出了该理论的范围。法院授予救济的管辖权是“无限制和无拘无束”的（依据Simon of Glaisdale勋爵在 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v. Harding [1973] A.C. 691, 726 案中所说），但在The Scaptradea案中被贵族院驳回为“诱惑性异端”（Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. A.B. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana [1983] 2 A.C. 694, 700案）。值得暂时注意的是，为什么它继续混淆以及为什么它是异端邪说。它具有明显的优点，即允许法院在个案中强加它认为是公平的解决办法。如果衡平法限制合法权利的执行，坚持他们有一个吸引人的广度是不合情理的。但法院拒绝这种概括的理由不仅仅取决于权威（参见Radcliffe勋爵在Campbell Discount Co. Ltd v. Bridge [1962] A.C. 600, 626案中所说），而且也是基于商业的实际考虑。总之，在许多交易形式中，如果合约明确规定了某些事情发生，合约双方应该明确地知道合约条款将得到执行，这一点非常重要。以“不合情理”为由拒绝执行合约的未明确酌情权的存在足以造成不确定性。即使最不可能授予救济的自由裁量权，它的存在也能使诉讼成为谈判策略。商业生活的现实是，这可能会造成不公正，而这种情况不能完全得到最终判决的补偿。

This clears the way for the main point in the appeal. The boundaries of the equitable jurisdiction to relieve against contractual penalties and forfeitures are in some places imprecise. But their Lordships do not think that it is necessary in this case to draw them more exactly because they agree with Litton V.-P. that the facts lie well beyond the reach of the doctrine. The notion that the court's jurisdiction to grant relief is "unlimited and unfettered" (per Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Shiloh Spinners Ltd v. Harding [1973] A.C. 691, 726) was rejected as a "beguiling heresy" by the House of Lords in The Scaptrade (Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. A.B. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana [1983] 2 A.C. 694, 700). It is worth pausing to notice why it continues to beguile and why it is a heresy. It has the obvious merit of allowing the court to impose what it considers to be a fair solution in the individual case. The principle that equity will restrain the enforcement of legal rights when it would be unconscionable to insist upon them has an attractive breadth. But the reasons why the courts have rejected such generalisations are founded not merely upon authority (see Lord Radcliffe in Campbell Discount Co. Ltd v.Bridge [1962] A.C. 600, 626) but also upon practical considerations of business. These are, in summary, that in many forms of transaction it is of great importance that if something happens for which the contract has made express provision, the parties should know with certainty that the terms of the contract will be enforced. The existence of an undefined discretion to refuse to enforce the contract on the ground that this would be "unconscion-able" is sufficient to create uncertainty. Even if it is most unlikely that a discretion to grant relief will be exercised, its mere existence enables litigation to be employed as a negotiating tactic. The realities of commercial life are that this may cause injustice which cannot be fully compensated by the ultimate decision in the case.

这种性质的考虑导致贵族院在The Scaptrade案中拒绝存在一个衡平法管辖权以解除船舶在租船合约下拖欠租金的情况，这一点如上诉法院[1983] Q.B. 529案，Robert Goff勋爵在第540-541页的判决书中所说，贵族院在[1983] 2 A.C.694,703-4中赞成并引用。当然，在所有交易中都不存在确定性的相同需求，并且困难的情况涉及企图界定管辖权，以便能够在适当情况下进行正义而不会破坏正常商业关系的稳定。

The considerations of this nature, which led the House of Lords in The Scaptrade to reject the existence of an equitable jurisdiction to relieve against the withdrawal of a ship for late payment of hire under a charterparty, are described in a passage from the judgment of Robert Goff L.J. in the Court of Appeal [1983] Q.B. 529, 540-541 which was cited with approval by the House: see [1983] 2 A.C. 694, 703-4. Of course the same need for certainty is not present in all transactions and the difficult cases have involved attempts to define the jurisdiction in a way which will enable justice to be done in appropriate cases without destabilising normal commercial relationships.

Hoffmann勋爵认为本委员会并不认为这是可能的，正如御用大律师Lyndon-Standord先生所认为的，“商业”案例如The Scaptrade案与土地的交易有关，这是衡平规则的传统主题之间进行广泛区分。土地也可以是商品，香港的楼宇可能是一个很好的例子。有必要更密切地关注交易的性质而不是其主题。授予救济的管辖权在延期偿还抵押贷款或租赁到期租金的情况下已得到充分确认。Wilberforce勋爵在Shiloh Spinners Ltd v.Harding [1973] AC 691案,第722页中声明了法院的作用原则如下：

如果可以说明交易的目的和插入对按金的权利，基本上是为了确保支付款项，衡平法一直愿意解除付款伴随着利息以及成本的条款，如果适用的话。

Their Lordships do not think that it is possible, as Mr. Lyndon-Stanford Q.C. suggested, to draw a broad distinction between "commercial" cases such as The Scaptrade and transactions concerning land, which are the traditional subject-matter of equitable rules. Land can also be an article of commerce and a flat in Hong Kong is probably as good an example as one could find. It is necessary to look more closely at the nature of the transaction rather than its subject-matter. The jurisdiction to grant relief is well established in cases of late payment of money due under a mortgage or rent due under a lease. The principle upon which the court acts was stated by Lord Wilberforce in Shiloh Spinners Ltd v. Harding [1973] A.C. 691, 722 as follows:-

"Where it is possible to state that the object of the transaction and of the insertion of the right to forfeit is essentially to secure the payment of money, equity has been willing to relieve on terms that the payment is made with interest, if appropriate, and also costs."

在这种情况下，尽管在抵押或租赁中没有明文规定，法院将“将它们塑造成单纯的保证金”：见Viscount Haldane L.C. in G. 和 C. Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Company Ltd [1914] AC 25, 35案。然而，在出售土地合约的情况下，情况则更为复杂。似乎在十八世纪，可能有人认为，出卖人的解除权利也被认为是“保证支付金钱的基本要素”，并且应该按照抵押的情况给予救济。Vernon v. Stephens (1722) P.Wms. 66可能是这种情况，尽管御前大臣Kent在Benedict v. Lynch (1815) 7 Am. Dec. 484, 488案中给予了不同的解释。但是，这种观点并没有在御前大臣Eldon在Hill v. Barclay (1811) 18 Ves. Jun. 56, 60案中著名的观点中存活下来。

“......法院当然受到影响，为了证明它假定的权利，放弃男性的法律合约，忽视实际的强制履行，根据这一概念，尽可能地将它们搁置在一边，在同样的情况下，就好像合约具有最高精确度的强制履行：然而经验的结果是，当他依据现有合约出售他的财产，被置于这种情况下，他不知道，不管他是否应该收到款项，何时应该支付，在这种情况下，在规定的时间内不履行条件的情况可能会证明他的破产，尽管所有法院都可以提供赔偿。”

In such cases the court will, despite the express words of forfeiture in the mortgage or lease, "mould them into mere securities": see Viscount Haldane L.C. in G. and C. Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Company Ltd [1914] AC 25, 35.

In the case of contracts for the sale of land, however, the position is rather more complicated. It appears that in the eighteenth century, there may have been a view that the vendor's right to rescind was also regarded as "essentially to secure the payment of money" and that relief should be given as in the case of a mortgage. Vernon v. Stephens (1722) P.Wms. 66 may have been such a case, although a different explanation is given by Chancellor Kent in Benedict v. Lynch (1815) 7 Am. Dec. 484, 488. But such an attitude did not survive Eldon L.C.'s famous outburst in Hill v. Barclay (1811) 18 Ves. Jun. 56, 60:-

"... the Court has certainly affected to justify that right, which it has assumed, to set aside the legal contracts of men, dispensing with the actual specific performance, upon the notion, that it places them, as nearly as can be, in the same situation as if the contract had been with the utmost precision specifically performed: yet the result of experience is, that, where a man, having contracted to sell his estate, is placed in this situation, that he cannot know, whether he is to receive the price, when it ought to be paid, the very circumstance, that the condition is not performed at the time stipulated, may prove his ruin, notwithstanding all the Court can offer as compensation."

当卖方行使撤销权时，他终止合约。Hoffmann勋爵认为买方丧失强制履行权可能被认为是没收了合约给予他在土地上的衡平法上的利益。但是，这种没收在性质上不同于，例如，卖方保留按金或部分支付购买价款的权利。只要这些保留超过预先估计真实的损害或合理的保证金，它们就构成了一种惩罚，可以说它基本上是为全额赔偿提供担保。存在对没收的恢复性救济形式产生了令人反感的不确定性，这赋予了法院酌情决定偿还全部或部分保留金的权利。但是，取消合约的权利虽然涉及终止了买方衡平法上的利益，但其立场却非常不同。它的目的是在违背一个必不可少的条款时，恢复卖方自由处理他的土地，只要他喜欢。在上涨的市场中，这样的权利可能是有价值的，但是很不稳定。本委员会认为，在这种情况下，卖方应该能够合理确定地知道他是否可以重新出售土地。

When a vendor exercises his right to rescind, he terminates the contract. The purchaser's loss of the right to specific performance may be said to amount to a forfeiture of the equitable interest which the contract gave him in the land. But this forfeiture is different in its nature from, for example, the vendor's right to retain a deposit or part payments of the purchase price. So far as these retentions exceed a genuine pre-estimate of damage or a reasonable deposit they will constitute a penalty which can be said to be essentially to provide security for payment of the full price. No objectionable uncertainty is created by the existence of a restitutionary form of relief against forfeiture, which gives the court a discretion to order repayment of all or part of the retained money. But the right to rescind the contract, though it involves termination of the purchaser's equitable interest, stands upon a rather different footing. Its purpose is, upon breach of an essential term, to restore to the vendor his freedom to deal with his land as he pleases. In a rising market, such a right may be valuable but volatile. Their Lordships think that in such circumstances a vendor should be able to know with reasonable certainty whether he may re-sell the land or not.

因此，过去八十年来，英格兰的法院尽管准备给予恢复性救济以免受处罚，但并不愿意以强制履行的方式给予救济，以防违反时间的构成核心要素。在Steedman v. Drinkle [1916] 1 AC 275案中，子爵Haldane在第279页说：

“衡平法院认为，与协议书有区别的实质内容无疑具有广泛的司法管辖权，使他们能够在司法要求的情况下裁定强制履行的情况，尽管关于时间的字面条款规定尚未奉行，但是他们从来没有行使过这种管辖权，当事人在协议中明确暗示，不应该规定时间是他们讨价还价的核心要素。”

It is for this reason that, for the past eighty years, the courts in England, although ready to grant restitutionary relief against penalties, have been unwilling to grant relief by way of specific perform¬ance against breach of an essential condition as to time. In Steedman v. Drinkle [1916] 1 AC 275 Viscount Haldane said at page 279:-

"Courts of Equity, which look at the substance as distinguished from the letter of agreements, no doubt exercise an extensive jurisdiction which enables them to decree specific performance in cases where justice requires it, even though literal terms of stipulations as to time have not been observed. But they never exercise this jurisdiction where the parties have expressly intimated in their agreement that it is not to apply by providing that time is to be of the essence of their bargain."

Hoffmann勋爵认为尽管在学术著作和澳大利亚的某些案件中，这一原则在英格兰或枢密院的任何案件中都从未被质疑过，但它们在历史上都是不准确和过分僵化的。当然，在Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co. Ex parte Hulse (1873) L.R. 8 Ch.App. 1022案中法院宣布了一项条款，规定没收一半的购买价格是一种惩罚，并通过一项强制履行法令予以解除，尽管明确规定时间是核心要素。Kilmer v. British Columbia Orchard Lands Ltd. [1913] AC 319案也可能发生过同样的情况，尽管后者的案件在Steedman v.Drinkle案件中有所区别，理由是双方同意新的完成日期，时间不再是核心要素。在Kilmer的判决中很难找到任何这种理由的痕迹，并且这种解释被认为是对历史的重写，但如果真是这样，那么，曾经是Kilmer董事会成员的Atkinson勋爵，在Brickles v. Snell [1916] 2 AC 599案中提交司法委员会的判决时的修订版本，但本委员会认为没有必要追究这些历史调查，因为可以自由地承认存在这样的案例，例如Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co. Ex parte Hulse案，法院似乎认为，首先，恢复性救济形式的救济由于某种原因是不适当的，其次，对商业确定性的需求不是如此强有力，以便通过强制履行来排除救济。Dagenham案的一个特点是，等待完成的五年买方已经占有土地，在此期间它已经自费建造了一个码头。在当时的英国不公正补充法律中，要找到一种可以充分解除没收的补救办法并不容易：比较Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 Q.B. 476案。

This principle has never since been questioned in any case in England or the Privy Council, although it has been criticised in academic writings and certain Australian cases as both historically inaccurate and unduly rigid. It is certainly true that in In re Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co. Ex parte Hulse (1873) L.R. 8 Ch.App. 1022 the court declared a term providing for forfeiture of half the purchase price to be a penalty and granted relief by a decree of specific performance, despite an express provision that time was to be of the essence. The same may have happened in Kilmer v. British Columbia Orchard Lands Ltd. [1913] AC 319, although the latter case was distinguished in Steedman v. Drinkle on the ground that the parties had agreed to a new completion date of which time was not to be of the essence. It is difficult to find any trace of this ground in the judgment in Kilmer and the explanation has been said to be a rewriting of history, although, if this was so, Lord Atkinson, who had been a member of the Board in Kilmer, adhered to the revised version when delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Brickles v. Snell [1916] 2 AC 599. But their Lordships do not think it necessary to pursue these historical inquiries because it can freely be acknowledged that there have been cases, such as In re Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co. Ex parte Hulse, in which the courts appear to have considered that, first, a restitutionary form of relief would for some reason be inadequate, and secondly, that the need for commercial certainty was not so strong as to make it necessary to exclude relief by way of specific performance. A feature of the Dagenham case was that the purchaser had been in possession of the land pending completion for five years, during which time it had constructed a dock at its own expense. In the then state of the English law of unjust enrichment, it would not have been easy to find a restitutionary remedy which provided adequate relief against forfeiture: compare Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 Q.B. 476.

类似的考虑告知了澳大利亚高等法院在Legione v. Hateley（1983）152 C.L.R.406案的判决。其中买方进入管理等待完成合约的时间至关重要，并在土地上建造了一所房屋。他们在要求延期并且收到供应商律师的职员的非委托答复后，未能在截止日期前完成。Gibbs首席法官和Murphy法官在第413-430页判决书中，认为谈话阻止了卖方依赖合约日期，直到确定的拒绝已经退回，然后经过了合理的时间。另外，买方在这片土地上建造了一座价值可观的房屋这样一个事实，那就是他们会因为一个相对微不足道的违约而受到“苛刻和过度的惩罚”（第429页），这个案例是一个例外，Steedman v.Drinkle案的原则不应该通过强制履行的法令来实施和解除。Mason和Deane法官在第430-451页不接受谈话等同于禁止反言，但同意以强制履行的方式授予救济，理由是谈话促成了买方的违约行为，连同案件的其他特征，使卖方撤销合约并收回财产是不合情理的。

Similar considerations informed the judgment of the High Court of Australia in Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 C.L.R. 406, in which the purchasers entered into possession pending completion of a contract of which time was of the essence and built a house upon the land. They failed to complete on the due date after asking for an extension and receiving a non-committal answer from a clerk with the vendors' solicitors. Gibbs C.J. and Murphy J., at pages 413-430, considered that the conversation estopped the vendors from relying upon the contractual date until a definite refusal had been returned and a reasonable time had then elapsed. Alternatively, the fact that the purchasers had built a house of consider¬able value upon the land, so that they would suffer a "harsh and excessive penalty for a comparatively trivial breach" (page 429) made the case an exceptional one in which the principle in Steedman v. Drinkle should not be applied and relief granted by way of a decree of specific performance. Mason and Deane JJ., at pages 430-451, did not accept that the conversation amounted to an estoppel, but agreed to the grant of relief by way of specific performance on the ground that the conversation had contributed to the purchaser's breach and that this, together with the other features of the case, made it unconscionable for the vendor to rescind the contract and recover the property.

相当于禁止反言的行为和有助于违反行为以致不加强制执行没收行为的行为之间的界限，在他们的主席看来是狭隘的，特别是鉴于广泛的现代禁止反悔概念，例如Taylors Fashions Ltd. v. Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd. (Note) [1982] QB 133案。在撇开禁止反言问题的情况下，无论是在Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co. Ex parte Hulse 还是Legione v. Hateley案可能被视为可能预期买方有权以恢复原状获得救济的案件，而不是通过被允许保留交易利益的方式，尽管他违反了必不可少的条款。然而，在任何情况下都不考虑恢复原状救济;部分无疑是因为法律分支机构的状态，部分原因是没有证据表明土地的价值超过了购买价格，从而在恢复原状和强制履行之间做出实际区别。在澳大利亚后来的Stern v. McArthur (1988) 165 C.L.R. 489案中，然而这一区分非常明显，并且使法院分歧很大。在这种情况下，买方在1969年以250美元的价格购买了一块土地，通过250美元的按金支付，之后每月付款不少于50美元。根据合约，如果购买价格的余额到期的分期付款违约超过4周，然后卖方可以在21天内发出通知以使时间成为核心要素。买方在土地上建造了一所房子，但在1979年他们违约并且未能遵守通知来完成。那时土地的价值大大增加了。买方提出了价格的尾款，并通过强制履行要求救济。卖方通过赔偿土地的改善而提供赔偿。Deane和Dawson法官在第528页说，分期付款“基本上是一种安排，即上诉人承诺在土地担保的情况下为被上诉人的购买提供资金”。有一个令人信服的比喻与抵押贷款，其中通常会授予豁免遗产的权利，当然，尽管明确表示时间是核心要素。Gaudron法官在530-542页的判决中，完全按照抵押贷款的比喻。 Mason首席法官在第493-505页和Brennan 法官在第505-521页，表示异议，将合约视为销售合约之一。他们拒绝接受买方违反明确赋予卖方取消资格的条款，可以声称保留交易的利益，并认为，提出的归还方式处理任何救济请求。

The line between conduct which amounts to an estoppel and conduct which contributes to the breach so as to make it unconscionable to enforce a forfeiture is in their Lordships' view a narrow one, particularly in view of the broad modern concept of estoppel which has been developed in cases such as Taylors Fashions Ltd. v. Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd. (Note) [1982] QB 133. Leaving aside the question of estoppel, both In re Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co. Ex parte Hulse and Legione v. Hateley could be regarded as cases in which it might have been expected that the purchaser should be entitled to relief by way of restitution rather than by way of being allowed to keep the benefit of the bargain in spite of his breach of an essential term. In neither case, however, was restitutionary relief considered; partly, no doubt, because of the state of the authorities on this branch of the law and partly because there was no suggestion that the value of the land so exceeded the purchase price as to make a practical difference between restitution and specific performance. In the later Australian case of Stern v. McArthur (1988) 165 C.L.R. 489, however, the distinction emerged very clearly and sharply divided the court. The purchasers in that case bought a plot of land in 1969 for A$5,250 payable by way of a deposit of $250 and thereafter by monthly instalments of not less than $50. Under the contract, on default in paying instalments for more than 4 weeks the balance of the purchase price became due, and the vendor could then serve a notice to complete within 21 days making time of the essence. The purchasers built a house upon the land but in 1979 they defaulted and failed to comply with a notice to complete. By that time the value of the land had greatly increased. The purchasers tendered the balance of the price and claimed relief by way of specific performance. The vendor offered restitution by way of compensation for their improvements to the land. Deane and Dawson JJ. said, at page 528, that the instalment payments were "essentially an arrangement whereby the appellants undertook to finance the respondents' purchase upon the security of the land". There was accordingly a compelling analogy with a mortgage, in which relief against forfeiture of the estate would ordinarily be granted as of course despite an express term that time was to be of the essence. Gaudron J. put her judgment, at pages 530-542, entirely upon the mortgage analogy. Mason C.J., at pages 493-505, and Brennan J., at pages 505-521, dissented, treating the contract as one of sale. They refused to accept that a purchaser, in breach of a term which expressly entitled the vendor to rescind, could claim to retain the benefit of the bargain and held that the offer of restitution disposed of any claim to relief.

衡平法总把交易是否是抵押作为依赖于物质而不是形式的问题，因此在Stern v. McArthur案中的意见分歧可以被认为是关于交易性质的恰当分析，而不是减少没收的管辖范围。但是法院认为没有必要进一步考虑这些澳大利亚的事态发展，因为他们在这种情况下对买方没有任何帮助。不存在任何惩罚的问题，或者卖方因购买方付出的改进或供应商的行为导致违约或交易实质上是抵押而被不公正地增加的问题。关于在这种情况下出现的问题的处理方式是否像澳大利亚法院所做的那样通过放宽Steedman v. Drinkle supra案的原则，仍然需要考虑未来的一些情况，或者通过发展恢复原状法和禁反言法。在当前的案中，似乎认为本委员会对一般规则的适用有完全的法律效力。事实是，买方迟到了。任何有关以迟到为由而获得救济的建议必将导致对迟到多晚的争论，这只能通过诉讼来解决。五年来，卖方不知道他是否有权转售该单位。在这种情况下，在最终判定之前，它已经通过小心消毒。在他的异议判决中，Godfrey J.A.法官说这个案件“为衡平法干预而呼喊”。本委员会认为，相反，它表明需要坚定地重申如下原则：如果由于未能遵守时间上的核心条件而撤销普通的土地买卖合约，衡平法就不会进行干预。

因此，本委员会将谦虚地建议女王陛下，应该驳回上诉。上诉人必须在其法院委员会之前支付答辩人的费用。

Equity has always regarded the question of whether a transaction is a mortgage as depending upon substance rather than form, so that the difference of opinion in Stern v. McArthur can be regarded as concerning the proper analysis of the nature of the transaction rather than the scope of the jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture. But their Lordships do not think it necessary to consider these Australian developments further because they provide no help for the purchaser in this case. There is no question of any penalty, or of the vendor being unjustly enriched by improvements made at the purchaser's expense, or of the vendor's conduct having contributed to the breach, or of the transaction being in substance a mortgage. It remains for consideration on some future occasion as to whether the way to deal with the problems which have arisen in such cases is by relaxing the principle in Steedman v. Drinkle supra, as the Australian courts have done, or by development of the law of restitution and estoppel. The present case seems to their Lordships to be one to which the full force of the general rule applies. The fact is that the purchaser was late. Any suggestion that relief can be obtained on the ground that he was only slightly late is bound to lead to arguments over how late is too late, which can be resolved only by litigation. For five years the vendor has not known whether he is entitled to resell the flat or not. It has been sterilised by a caution pending a final decision in this case. In his dissenting judgment, Godfrey J.A. said that the case "cries out for the intervention of equity". Their Lordships think that, on the contrary, it shows the need for a firm restatement of the principle that in cases of rescission of an ordinary contract of sale of land for failure to comply with an essential condition as to time, equity will not intervene.

Their Lordships will accordingly humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellant must pay the respondent's costs before their Lordships' Board.

总结：

本案楼宇买卖发生在香港，判决也是在香港法院进行；香港最高法院判决之后继续上诉到枢密院司法委员会（Judicial Committee of the Privy Council）。可能有人对此不大了解，因此有必要简单介绍一下。在1997年香港回归之前，香港由英国管理，因此采用的是英国的司法体系，这个枢密院司法委员会是英国其中一个最高法院，亦是英国海外属地、殖民地和英联邦成员国家的最高上诉法院（the highest court of appeal ）和终审法院（court of last resort)）。司法委员会审理案件至少应由三人组成合议庭共同审理，但通常是由5人参加，在本案中即由Goff of Chieveley, Griffiths, Mustill, Hoffmann及Hope of Craighead五位大法官组成。枢密院司法委员会的决定有很强的说服力，但在英国法院并不具有拘束力。委员会本身不受以前决定的约束。从技术上说，委员会的决定并不是判决，而是向女王提交的建议（advice），因此往往以Their lordships或the Board自称，并以如下此举结尾：Their lordship will accordingly humbly advise Her Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed (or allowed)，如本案的所说。事实上，建议总是被采纳，并以枢密院令（Order in Council）的形式发布。由于是向内部网提交的建议，所以该委员会的决定一向是一致意见，但从1966年以来，持有不同意见的法官可以发表异议。

回到本案的具体情况，买卖双方协议在9月30日下午5点前完成尾款支付，但买方未能在5点前完成，最终在5点10分的时候才送达支票。但是卖方以买方违反了合约，撤销了买卖，并没收了按金。买方认为他的轻微违约，仅仅迟了10分钟并不会导致合约丧失，要求法院下达强制履行令，执行楼宇买卖。

但是枢密院通过分析后裁定，澳大利亚衡平法中较宽阔的取向，容许不履行合约的买方基于不合情理这点取得免被没收按金的救济，不能应用于香港含有时限规定是核心要素的合约中。而枢密院司法委员会也认为，本案的情况，相反，它表明需要坚定地重申如下原则：如果由于未能遵守时间上的核心条件而撤销普通的土地买卖合约，衡平法就不会进行干预。最终买方的上诉被驳回，并且需要支付卖方的相关律师费用。

另外需要考虑到的是，根据衡平法，法庭可以行使酌情权决定是否命令退还按金；因此在一些后来的案件中，相关法院对于卖方稍迟于往常交易或者买方拒绝完成交易的情况，采取了较为宽松的方法。例如在Ocean Force Enterprises Limited v. Chun Sau Wan & Grand Fully Holdings Limited [1999] HCA No.3157 案中，买卖双方的律师没有将时钟同步化，因此不能确定买方是否确实迟了交付支票完成交易。在Regal Success Venture Ltd v. Jonlin Ltd [2000] CACV No.221案中，法院裁定买方律师以不满意卖方的业权为由选择退出交易，是真诚地并以合理的谨慎行事，在这种情况下，买方可以退出交易，并获得退还按金。

而关于衡平法赋予法庭的法定酌情权，在Omar v. El-Wakil [2001] EWCA Civ 1090中，认为只有在很特殊的情况下才会因买方没有履行合约而行使法定酌情权。通常情况下，法院在处理类似的法定酌情权，与衡平司法管辖权下的处理方式不会有重大区别。

许多案例出现了关于履约时间的合约规定是否应该被解释为把时间作为合约的核心要素（即作为条件）或作为中间条款的问题。根据普通法，关于履约时间的规定通常被认为是合约核心要素。但在衡平法方面，他们一般不被如此看待，特别是在出售土地合约方面，如今以衡平法规则为准。贵族院在United Scientific Holdings Ltd v Burnley BC案中考虑了普通法和衡平法规则之间的关系，其中认为租金审查中规定的时间表为完成确定租金的各种步骤就审查后的这段期间而言，应付的款项并非核心要素。然而，显而易见的是，尽管对时间的规定通常不会被认为是关键性的，但如果明确说明是这样的话，或者如果法院从该主题的性质合约或当事方希望他们具有这种效力的背景环境。在商业合约中，重要的是各方应该确切地知道他们的义务是什么，并且能够对他们的行为的法律结果充满信心地行事，法院很容易就关于时间的规定解释为合约的条件。参《Chitty on Contracts》12-307如下描述：

Classification of time stipulations.

12–037

A number of cases have arisen relating to the question whether contractual stipulations as to the time of performance should be construed as making time of the essence of the contract (i.e. as conditions) or as intermediate terms. At common law, stipulations as to the time of performance were normally regarded as being of the essence of a contract. But in equity they were not generally so regarded,in particular in relation to contracts for the sale of land, and today the equitable rule prevails. The relationship between the common law and equitable rules was considered by the House of Lords in United Scientific Holdings Ltd v Burnley BC, where it was held that the time-table specified in rent review clauses for the completion of the various steps for determining the rent payable in respect of the period following the review was not of the essence. It is, however, clear that, although stipulations as to time will not ordinarily be construed as being of the essence, they will be so construed if expressly stated to be such or if the court infers from the nature of the subject-matter of the contract or the surrounding circumstances that the parties intended them to have that effect. In mercantile contracts, where it is of importance that the parties should know precisely what their obligations are and be able to act with confidence in the legal results of their actions, the courts will readily construe a stipulation as to time as a condition of the contract.

合约有关时间规定的法律存在许多困难。首先，“时间是合约的核心要素”这个常用的短语可能会产生误导，因为每种情况下的问题都是时间是否是已经违背的特定条款的核心要素，而不是时间是否是整个合约的核心要素。第二，历史上，普通法和衡平法对合约中的时间规定采取了不同的方法。根据普通法，采取了严格的方法，正如John Romilly M.R.爵士曾经说过的那样：

在法律上时间始终是合约的核心要素，当已经规定任何完成的时间，合约必须在指定的日期完成，否则就会有违反它的诉讼。如《Chitty on Contracts》21-011如下所说：

21–011 Time ‘‘of the essence of the contract’’.58

A number of difficulties surround the law relating to time stipulations in contracts. The first is that the phrase whichis commonly employed, namely ‘‘time is of the essence of the contract’’, ispotentially misleading in that the question in each case is whether time is of theessence of the particular term which has been broken, not whether time is of theessence of the contract as a whole. The second is that, historically, common lawand equity adopted a divergent approach to time stipulations in contracts. Atcommon law a strict approach was taken so that, as was once stated by Sir JohnRomilly M.R.:

‘‘ . . . at law time is always of the essence of the contract. When any time is fixed for the completion of it, the contract must be completed on the day specified, or an action will lie for breach of it.’’

Parkin v Thorold (1852) 16 Beav. 59, 65.

现在回到本文开头所说的，如果合约中已经明确规定时间是核心要素（essence）；或者一方不合理行事导致延误，另一方给予了通知，要求该方在合理的时间内履约；或者因合约环境的变化，时间变成了要素，那么无论延误或违反的结果如何轻微，都构成毁约。

关于合约中明确或者默示地表示时间是核心要素，可以参《Chitty on Contracts》21-013，如下：

(1) Where the parties have expressly stipulated in their contract that the time fixed for performance must be exactly complied with, or that time is to be ‘‘of the essence’’.

(2) Where the circumstances of the contract or the nature of the subject-matter indicate that the fixed date must be exactly complied with, e.g. the purchase of a leasehold house required for immediate occupation; the sale of business land or premises, such as a public-house as a going concern; the sale of a reversionary interest; the exercise of an option for the purchase or repurchase of property, or for determining a lease under a ‘‘break’’ clause or an option to acquire a leasehold interest in futuro (since in these cases, ‘‘the parties on the exercise of the option, are brought into a new legal relationship’’); ‘‘mercantile contracts’’, such as a contract for the sale of goods where a time is fixed for delivery, or for the sale of shares liable to fluctuate in value (where the contract stipulated a time for payment), or a charterparty under which the owner is given the right to withdraw the vessel in default of ‘‘punctual payment’’ of hire.

即：

（1）如果当事人在合约中明确规定，履约所确定的时间必须严格遵守，或该时间将是核心要素。

（2）如果合约的情况或主题的性质表明必须严格遵守固定的日期，例如购买需要立即占用的租赁房屋；出售商业用地或房产，如公共房屋作为持续经营；出售复归利益；行使购买或回购财产的选择权，或根据“生约”条款确定租赁或选择取得未来租赁权益（因为在这些情况下，“双方行使这个选择，被带入一个新的法律关系“）；“商业合约”，例如在交货时间固定的情况下出售货物的合约或出售可能价值波动的股份（合约规定了付款时间），或者租船合约规定出租人有权在没有按时支付租金的情况下撤回船舶。

然而，合约可以被标注为“商业的”或“商务的”的事实并不能确定问题。时间限制是否属于合约条款的核心要素，是整个合约范围内对条款的解释问题。问题在于，特定条款中规定的时间是否（明示或必要暗示）是当事方意图必不可少的，例如，因为他们需要准确地知道他们各自的义务。因此，如果买方需要提前15天通知船舶准备就绪，以便卖方可以指定装货港口，贵族院判时间是核心要素：买方的履行是卖方履行其义务的先决条件。（但是，根据1979年货物销售法案第10条，除非合约条款中出现不同的意图，否则规定关于付款时间不被视为销售合约的核心要素。）

However, the mere fact that the contract can be labelled ‘‘mercantile’’ or ‘‘commercial’’ does not determine the issue. Whether a time limit is of the essence of a contractual provision is a question of interpretation of the provision in the context of the contract as a whole. The question is whether the time specified in the particular clause was (expressly or by necessary implication) intended by the parties to be essential, e.g. because they needed to know precisely what were their respective obligations. Thus, where the buyers were required to give 15 days’ notice of readiness of the vessel so that the sellers could then nominate the port for loading, the House of Lords held time to be of the essence: performance by the buyers was a condition precedent to the sellers’ ability to perform their obligation. (However, under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 s.10, unless a different intention appears from the terms of the contract, stipulations as to time of payment are not deemed to be of the essence of the contract of sale.)

关于通知使时间变为核心要素的问题，可以参《Chitty on Contracts》21-014，如下：

21–014 Notice making time ‘‘of the essence’’.

(3) Where time was not originally of the essence of the contract, but one party has been guilty of undue delay, the other party may give notice requiring the contract to be performed within a reasonable time. Notice can be served at the moment of breach: it is not necessary to wait until there has been an unreasonable delay by the party in breach before serving the notice. The period of notice given must, however, be reasonable and what is reasonable will depend upon all the facts and circumstances of the case. Factors to which the courts will have regard in assessing the reasonableness of the period of notice include what remains to be done at the date of the notice; the fact that the party giving the notice has continually pressed for completion, or has before given similar notices which it has waived; or that it is especially important for it to obtain early completion. A party who elects to give notice immediately upon the breach of contract would be well advised to be ‘‘cautious’’ in its selection of the period to be included in the notice.

Notice making time of the essence of the contract can be given in relation to any term of the contract: entitlement to give notice is not confined to essential terms of the contract. The party serving the notice must not itself be in default. Once notice has been given, both parties are bound by it so that, if the party giving the notice is not ready to perform on the expiry of the notice, the other party may be entitled to terminate. If, by notice, a party has made time of the essence, but later allows a further extension to another fixed date, time remains of the essence. The notice procedure laid down in the contract may be held to be exhaustive of the rights of the parties so that it will not be open to them to serve a notice (for example, of shorter duration) under the general law rather than the contract.

即：

（3）如果时间本来不是合约的核心要素，但一方有不当延误，另一方可以发出通知，要求合约在合理的时间内履行。通知可以在违约时送达：在服务通知之前，没有必要等到违约方发生不合理的延误。但是，通知的期限必须合理，合理的取决于根据案件的所有事实和情况。法院在评估通知期的合理性时将考虑的因素包括在通知发布之日仍有待完成的事项；发出通知的一方不断要求完成，或者之前已发出类似的放弃通知；或者它对获得提前完成尤为重要。选择在违约时立即发出通知的一方，在选择通知中包含的期限时应谨慎。

关于合约的任何条款，可以给出合约核心要素的时间通知：给予通知的权利不限于合约的基本条款。提供通知的一方本身不得违约。一旦发出通知，双方均受其约束，因此，如果发出通知的一方在通知到期时尚未准备好履行，另一方可能有权终止。如果通过通知，一方已经花时间了解了本质，但后来又允许进一步延伸到另一个固定日期，时间仍然是核心要素。合约中规定的通知程序可能被认为是对各方权利的穷尽，因此根据一般法律而不是合约，他们不再可发送通知（例如更短的通知）。

对于违反时间是核心要素的后果问题，参《Chitty on Contracts》21-105，如下：

In determining the consequences of a stipulation that time is to be ‘‘of the essence’’ of an obligation, it is vital to distinguish between the case where both parties agree that time is to be of the essence of the obligation and the case where, following a breach of a nonessential term of the contract, the innocent party serves a notice on the other stating that time is to be of the essence. In the former case the effect of declaring time to be of the essence is to elevate the term to the status of a ‘‘condition’’with the consequences that a failure to perform by the stipulated time will entitle the innocent party to: (a) terminate performance of the contract and thereby put an end to all the primary obligations of both parties remaining unperformed; and (b) claim damages from the contract-breaker on the basis that it has committed a fundamental breach of the contract (‘‘a breach going to the root of the contract’’) depriving the innocent party of the benefit of the contract (‘‘damages for loss of the whole transaction’’).

在确定时间是义务的核心要素规定的后果时，必须区分双方同意时间是义务的核心要素的情况以及在违反合约的非实质性条款之后，无辜的一方在另一方面发出通知，说明时间将是核心要素。在前一种情况下，宣布时间为核心要素的效果是将该条款提升到“条件”的状态，其后果是在规定的时间内未能履行将使无辜的一方有权：（a）终止合约的履行，从而结束双方尚未履行的所有主要义务；（b）以从根本违反合约（“违约动摇了合约的根基”）剥夺无辜一方的合约的利益为理由，要求合约违约方赔偿损失（“整个交易损失的损害赔偿”）。

最后，结合这些权威，对于时间是否是核心要素的问题，可归纳如下：

（1）合约明确规定或默示时间是核心要素；

（2）合约本来未列明是核心要素，但当对方不合理延误，一方给予了通知，要

求对方在合理的时间内履行，则时间变成了核心要素；

（3）因合约或环境等变更，使时间变成了核心要素。

如果时间是或变成了核心要素，那么任何延误，不管如何轻微，都构成了毁约。如本文所列举的案例，哪怕买方仅仅迟到了10分钟，卖方即有权撤销楼宇买卖合约，并没收按金。

2018.04.28