编者按
中美关系经历了跌宕起伏的一年：贸易战引发全球震荡，围绕南海、台海问题的博弈不断上演。在此大背景下，国际政界、学界越来越频繁地提及并讨论一个概念——“修昔底德陷阱”。古希腊历史学家修昔底德在《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》一书中认为，“战争之所以不可避免，是因为雅典的崛起与斯巴达因此产生的恐惧”。在此基础上，美国哈佛大学教授格雷厄姆·艾利森提出“修昔底德陷阱”一词，即当一个崛起大国威胁取代现有守成大国时，战争不可避免。
现年78岁的艾利森是哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院首任院长。2012年，他在英国《金融时报》发表的一篇文章让“修昔底德陷阱”一词逐渐进入国际舆论视野。去年，艾利森出版的《注定一战：中美能避免修昔底德陷阱吗？》一书引发强烈反响。该书详述过去500年间发生在守成大国与崛起大国间的权力更迭，列举的16个案例中共有12个引发战争，仅4次幸免。不过对于未来中美能否避免一战，艾利森态度谨慎，未在书中做出预判。近日，艾利森在北京接受环环（ID：huanqiu-com）专访，详述他眼中的中美关系现状。
12月14日，艾利森在中国人民大学“国·政”大讲堂做题为“中美能避免修昔底德陷阱吗”的演讲
中美贸易“休战期”，
双方很可能获得暂时的胜利
环环：最近，华为高管孟晚舟在加拿大遭拘押一事备受关注。您前几天评论此事时说：“事情正以难以逆转的趋势恶化下去。”您能进一步解释这句话吗？
艾利森：要理解美中关系的现状，首先要了解两国的整体关系正受到一种修昔底德式态势的推动——崛起的中国正在冲击占据主导地位的美国。
中国正感到自身变得更大、更强，同时也感受到来自美国的约束或遏制。而已习惯于发号施令的美国正感受到来自中国的打扰与妨碍。接下来，这种竞争可能会扩散到两国关系中的方方面面。
尤其是眼下美国政府已认定中国不再是战略伙伴，而是战略对手。美国正在所有领域排挤中国。它有意这么做，并为此组织其力量。我们正在贸易冲突、限制投资、技术竞争等所有层面目睹这一现象，孟晚舟案只是这种现象的又一例证。
环环：有分析认为，出人意料的孟晚舟案或在中美之间触发冷战，您如何看待这一观点？
艾利森：还是要将该事件置于大背景下。美国副总统彭斯在今年10月的讲话中表示，美国将在所有层面对中国发起反击，除了使用炸弹与子弹。按照他的说法，这是一场中国早在25年前就对美国发起的冷战，只是美国此前未曾注意到而已。特朗普政府如今意识到冷战正在上演的现实，不同之处在于美国将发起反击。
华为非常成功，该公司已成为世界上最大的通信和互联网设备供应商之一，其智能手机销量超过美国苹果公司。
但美国人说华为与中国情报部门的关系非常密切，因此正在排挤华为。人们可以看到，“五眼”情报联盟中的每一个国家都正将华为排除在其主要供应商行列之外。在英国，这种（排挤华为的）做法尤其痛苦，因为华为是其主要通信供应商之一。但这只是这场斗争的另一个竞技场。
拘押华为高管的举动令我吃惊。我不知道具体情况，但我知道人们都是怎么说的。在我看来，实际情况更为复杂。我认为，这是显示美中关系现状的又一个例证。如果你我是战略对手且我们正在每个层面都相互反击，那么就应该预料到这样的事情会发生。
环环：眼下中美经贸摩擦进入90天“休战期”。您觉得双方在最终期限前达成协议的可能性有多大？
艾利森：没人知道。但我确信，中国政府十分希望达成协议并正为此做出巨大努力，特朗普总统也希望取得成绩，所以双方很可能达成某种协议。届时要么进一步延长“休战期”，要么改变或调整关税。中美很可能获得暂时的胜利。但我认为，从长期来看，这些问题在可预见的将来会再次出现并继续恶化。除非美中两国为双边关系找到一条通往新的战略逻辑和新型大国关系的途径，找到一些新想法。
“修昔底德陷阱”是一种长期不断跌落的趋势，并非是起起落落
环环：正如您《注定一战：中美能避免修昔底德陷阱吗？》一书中提到的，中国领导人多次在公开场合提到“修昔底德陷阱”，并显示出愿意从历史案例里汲取经验教训、避免悲剧重演的意愿。美国政界高层人士，尤其是特朗普，对该理论持什么态度？
艾利森：我没有信心谈论特朗普总统，因为我从未就此话题与他交谈。但我可以说，美国国防部长马蒂斯熟谙“修昔底德陷阱”，非常担心该陷阱可能带来的后果。我与美国国务卿蓬佩奥也交谈过多次，他对这一理论非常了解，并对此持谨慎、严肃的态度。还有美军参谋长联席会议主席邓福德、美国国家安全委员会负责中国事务的主管马特·波廷格对此都有深入理解。我认为，特朗普政府对中美陷入“修昔底德陷阱”的可能性已经非常清楚。特朗普并不热衷阅读历史，但他有“求生”的本能。我希望这个基本概念正在深入人心。
环环：过去两年来，中美关系一直像坐过山车。您认为原因是什么？“修昔底德陷阱”能否解释这个现象？
艾利森：“修昔底德陷阱”并非针对双边关系起起伏伏的现象，而是讲述关系正走在下坡路上——事态正在加速地变得更糟。
现实是，中国正变得更大更强，美国感觉正被中国逼迫，然后双方的感受与错误感受被放大，接下来的情绪与恐惧使得事态变得更糟。无论是崛起大国还是守成大国，相互争夺权力时往往会夸大另一方的实力与威胁。这一切成为了“邪恶的组合”。
在这个过程中，人们会偶尔想起，（比如）这场贸易战将是一场灾难，我们应该阻止它。于是过山车向上爬升了一点儿。但随后，它会接着向下跌落。因此“修昔底德陷阱”令人担心的是，这是一种长期不断跌落的趋势，而不是过山车般起起落落的微小变化。
中国崛起能否被接受？
美国人终究是务实的
环环：您说，彭斯将中国描述为一个战略对手。这种观点代表美国战略圈和学界中的主流观点吗？
艾利森：很遗憾，是的。如今特朗普已不是政界的“例外”。总体而言，无论是民主党人还是共和党人，都把中国视为一个战略对手。在高校和智库里，尤其是研究中国的人士中，许多人都认为他们被中国骗了。他们曾认为中国将成为一个负责任的利益攸关方，并安于在美国主导的国际秩序内。但你瞧，到头来中国希望成为（自己期待的）中国，而不是美国期待的中国。
正如我在《注定一战：中美能避免修昔底德陷阱吗？》中所言，我认为这些人的想法很天真。新加坡建国总理李光耀曾说，随着中国变大变强，中国将希望做中国，要大家接受它是中国，而非成为西方的名誉会员。
美国人曾认为，中国将追随日本和德国的足迹——开放、更富有、中产阶层扩大。然后中产阶层将要求获得政治权利，中国随之实现民主化，并且在美国主导的秩序中找到自己的位置。这种看法非常理想化。
中国人认为，中国是一个伟大的社会，历史上一直如此，只是在最近一两百年，这一想法被带着技术来剥削中国的欧洲人暂时打断而已。但中国人认为自己将恢复起来，中国将再次伟大。我认为这完全可以理解。修昔底德态势并不古怪、亦非产生于个人动机，这是现实状况形成的态势。但在美国政策圈内，你可以看到人们总是希望对中国更加强硬。我认为这种做法并不健康，也无助于拥有看清现实的眼睛。
环环：您建议美国要学会接受中国强大。但目前似乎看不到迹象。美国到底会不会接受这个现实？
艾利森：现实是，中国将必然变得更大更强，除非在发展的过程中偏离轨道——我不认为这有可能发生。这就是生活。正如我在书中援引的李光耀的观点。他说，看，美国不会喜欢这种局面，因为美国已习惯于在任何层面“当老大”。因此，美国接受这个现实会非常痛苦，这个过程需要很长时间。但美国人终究是务实的。
对中国人来说，要做到不急不躁也并非易事。我想说，无论是中国人还是美国人，都需要付出艰苦努力才能适应现实，生活本身就是一件不容易的事。正因为如此，所有美国人和中国人都应该深入思考，如何才能避开“修昔底德陷阱”。我们应该具有创造力和想象力。对此，我是抱有希望的。
以下是Global Times的相关英文报道：
Thucydides Trap author believes US has been taken aback by China’s rise
Editor's Note:
When history proves a war between Beijing and Washington is seemingly inevitable, what should we do? What is happening exactly between the two powers, which seem to be locked in a rivalry? What is US leaders' attitude toward the historical lessons of clashes between rising and established powers? Will the US learn to accept China getting strong eventually? Graham Allison (Allison), Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University, who coined the term "Thucydides Trap," shared his views on these issues in an exclusive interview with Global Times (GT) reporter Li Aixin.
GT: A few days ago in Shanghai, you were quoted commenting on the Meng Wanzhou case that "things get worse before they get worse." Could you please elaborate on that?
Allison:The first thing to understand about what's happening in the relationship between the US and China is that the overall relationship is driven by a Thucydidean dynamic, in which a rising China is impacting a ruling US, with all of the natural and predictable consequences of that.
China is feeling bigger and stronger and feeling constrained or contained by America. America, which is accustomed to ruling, is feeling disrupted and disturbed by a rising China. If that's the case, this competition then spreads across the whole relationship.
Especially now that the American government has concluded that China is no longer a strategic partner, but a strategic adversary, it is pushing back against China in every space. It means to. It is trying to organize the ability to. So we see this in trade conflict, in constrained investments, in the competition for technology, in each arena. This is just another example of an underlying phenomenon.
GT:Some observers say this unexpected episode could lead to a cold war between China and the US, what's your take on this?
Allison:Again, to put it in context, US Vice President Pence gave a speech in October that said the US will now fight back against China in every dimension except bombs and bullets in a new cold war. According to Pence, it is a cold war that China has already been waging against the US for 25 years, except the Americans didn't notice. He said the Trump administration has awakened to the fact that the cold war is happening now, what's new is that Americans will be fighting back in every dimension except bombs and bullets. That's why he calls it cold war, Cold War 2.0.
In that regard, Huawei, which has become China's champion for telecommunication and internet backbones, and the biggest supplier of telecom and internet equipment in the world, the bigger smartphone maker than Apple, is being very successful.
But Huawei has pretty tight relationships with Chinese intelligence, so the Americans say. If Huawei has installed the basic infrastructure of a nation's internet and telecommunication equipment, that makes it easier for China to spy on that system, that's what the Americans say. So the Americans are pushing back against Huawei.
You can see that in each one of the so-called Five Eyes, the five countries that share intelligence with each other - the US, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada - they are excluding Huawei from their major suppliers. In Britain this is especially painful right now, because Huawei is a big supplier of telecommunication in Britain. This is just another arena of the struggle.
The move, the arrest of the CFO, surprises me. I don't know the details. I know what people have said, but it also looks to me to be more complicated than that. Until I know more of the facts, I can't say exactly about that. But I think that's another illustration of what happens. If you and I are strategic adversaries and we are fighting back in every dimension, then we should expect things like that.
GT: We are seeing a 90-day trade truce between Beijing and Washington. What do you think is the chance to reach an agreement before the deadline?
Allison: Nobody knows. But my bet is that because the Chinese government very much wants to reach an agreement and is working very hard, and because President Trump wants to have a success, I think it's likely that there will be an agreement of some sort. Either the truce will be extended further or the tariffs will be adapted or adjusted, I would say more likely than not they would have a temporary victory. But my longer-term bet is, the issues will re-arise and will continue getting worse for the foreseeable future.
Unless both the US and China find a way to a new strategic rationale for the relationship, a new form of great power relationship, so we were talking, some big new ideas, that things will get worse.
GT: As you mentioned in the book, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap, Chinese president is familiar with Thucydides' trap and showed his willingness to learn from history, what are US leaders' attitude, especially President Trump, to the theory?
Allison:I cannot say with any confidence about President Trump because I don't know him and have never talked to him about this. But I can say James Mattis, US secretary of defense, big student of Thucydides, is very knowledgeable about Thucydides Trap, very concerned about what the consequences could be. So, for sure, he understands it very well. Mike Pompeo, the secretary of State, again, I've talked to him many times about it. He understands it very well and is very serious about it. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joseph Dunford is very thoughtful about this. Matt Pottinger, who is the person at National Security Council responsible for the China account, understands it very well. I think the Trump administration is very well informed about the possibilities.
President Trump is not a great reader of history. But he does have survival instincts. I would hope that the basic ideas are sinking in. But I don't know that yet.
GT: Over the past two years, ties between China and the US have been like riding on a roller coaster. What caused so many twists and turns in so short a time? Is Thucydides' Trap the answer to it?
Allison: The roller coaster goes up and down, Thucydides' Trap is not addressing that part. The Thucydidean dynamic tells you the slope of the relationship - it gets worse before it gets worse.
The reality is, I am getting bigger and stronger and you are feeling me pressing against you. Then the perception and misperception by both of us exaggerates, and then the emotions and fear make things even worse. Then the political struggle within each of the rising power and the ruling power means that people who were struggling with each other for power inside have a tendency to exaggerate the other. All this makes a very wicked brew that can make things worse.
At the same time, people look and say, "Wait, where this is happening." So occasionally you get a moment where people are thinking, this trade war will be a disaster for everybody, let's stop it. So the roller coaster goes up for a little bit. But then it comes back down a little bit. So the worrying (factor) in the Thucydidean dynamic is the slope of deterioration, not the perturbation of ups and downs as you go.
GT: You said Pence described China as a strategic adversary. Does this term represent mainstream view among US strategic circles and scholars?
Allison:Unfortunately, yes. I think this is a very unsatisfactory summary.
Trump is not the exception in the political class now. Across the board, Democrats and Republicans see China as the strategic adversary. In the policy surround in the universities and think tanks, especially for the people that study China, many of them feel like they were duped, or that they thought China was going to become a responsible stakeholder that was going to take its place in the America-led international order. And lo and behold, China wants to be China.
I believe, as I write in my book, this earlier belief was na?ve. I quote Lee Kuan Yew on this. He said, as China gets bigger and stronger, China will want to be China and accepted as such, not as an honorary member of the West.
Americans were thinking China will follow the footsteps of Japan and Germany, it will open itself, it will become richer, it will have a middle class, middle class would demand political rights, therefore it will democratize, and then, it will be peaceful and take its place in the America-led order. You can see what Japan and Germany did. Maybe that was idealistic, well, certainly naive.
Chinese have thought that China was a great society forever, for a thousand years except for this temporary interruption for the last couple of hundred years, when Europeans with technologies showed up to exploit us. But we are going to recover and become China again, make China great again. That's very understandable I think. And that's why the Thucydidean dynamic… is not idiosyncratic, this is not personally motivated. This is the dynamic of the reality of the situation.
But in the American policy community, you can see people beating themselves, ok, I will be tougher on China than the next person. I think this is not healthy. Because it doesn't help you have clear eyes to see the reality.
GT: You suggested that the US should learn to accept China getting strong. But for the moment, the US seems to have shown no sign of willingness to do so, how long do you think it would take before the US accepts it? Or will the US accept it at all?
Allison: The reality is, unless China goes off on some other trajectory, and I think it's not likely that it will, China will inevitably get bigger and stronger. That's just life. And as I quote Lee Kuan Yew in the book, he says look, Americans will not like this, because Americans are accustomed to be No. 1 in everything. So this will be very painful. He said it will be especially painful for Americans because of a small, poor, miserable people they looked down on become big and strong. So this will take a long time. But ultimately Americans are very pragmatic.
It will be also very painful for Chinese for not being impatient. I would say it will take some hard work both by Chinese and Americans to adjust. The fact is life is hard, it's not supposed to be easy. That's why I think we should have all Americans and Chinese do very serious thinking about how can we escape the Thucydides Trap, and we should be very imaginative, so that's why I am hopeful.
来源：环球时报－环球网、Global Times
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